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MARKET DYNAMICS AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS IN REAL ESTATE UNDER INSECURITY: EVIDENCE FROM BOKO HARAM-IMPACTED REGIONS IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

This study examines the transformation of real estate market dynamics and investment decision-making processes in Nigeria's Boko Haram-impacted regions, with particular focus on Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Kano, and Kaduna states. Using secondary data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix, National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) reports, and qualitative insights from focus group discussions conducted in Maiduguri and Yola (2020–2021), the study analyzes property value fluctuations, vacancy rates, rental price dynamics, and housing deficit impacts. Findings reveal that the insurgency increased housing deficits by 43% in Borno State, caused property demand to decline by 40% in Northern Nigeria, and resulted in vacancy rates reaching 30% across affected states. Property prices in prime Kano locations declined by 30–40% to approximately $36,000 per plot, while rental prices in Maiduguri escalated by 100–400% due to internally displaced person (IDP) influx. The study concludes that insecurity has emerged as a dominant force reshaping Nigeria's real estate landscape, with investors adopting risk-averse strategies and developers withdrawing from high-risk areas. The paper proposes a multi-tiered policy framework for sector recovery.

Keywords: Boko Haram insurgency, real estate market, investment decisions, housing deficit, property values, displacement, Nigeria, insecurity

1. Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

The Nigerian real estate sector has traditionally been shaped by macroeconomic fundamentals such as inflation, population growth, urbanization rates, and infrastructure development. However, since 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency has emerged as a transformative exogenous shock fundamentally reshaping market dynamics across North-Eastern Nigeria and adjoining regions. The terrorist organization, whose name translates loosely as "Western education is forbidden," has caused the destruction of public and private properties worth billions of Naira, contributing to Nigeria's ranking as one of the most terrorism-affected countries globally (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015).

The insurgency has displaced over 2 million persons across North-Eastern states Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Taraba, and Bauchi comprising approximately 316,331 households, with Borno State alone recording over 1 million displaced persons, accounting for roughly 77% of regional displacement (IOM, 2015). This massive displacement has compounded Nigeria's existing housing crisis. As of 2025, Nigeria's housing deficit stands at approximately 14.9–15.2 million units according to the Federal Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, with Kano State recording the highest deficit among all states (FMHUD, 2025). The Boko Haram scourge has affected approximately 956,453 (nearly 30%) out of 3,232,308 private houses in Borno State, further deepening the crisis.

1.2 Problem Statement

Growing terrorism activities have severely disrupted the real estate market in Northern Nigeria, with property demand falling by as much as 40% in the first quarter of peak conflict periods. Property values have declined considerably due to suppressed demand, with vacancy rates reaching 30% in Yobe, Adamawa, Borno, Katsina, Kano, and Kaduna states (NIESV, 2020). Simultaneously, host communities such as Maiduguri experience rental price increases of 100–400% due to IDP influx and the concentration of humanitarian workers, creating a dual-market phenomenon where conflict zones suffer depreciation while relatively safe host communities experience inflationary pressure.

1.3 Research Objectives

This study seeks to:

1. Analyze the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on residential property demand and values in impacted regions;
2. Examine investment decision-making patterns of real estate developers under conditions of prolonged insecurity;
3. Quantify housing deficit increases and displacement patterns between 2013 and 2018;
4. Assess rental price dynamics in host communities receiving internally displaced persons;
5. Propose evidence-based policy interventions for real estate sector recovery.

1.4 Research Questions

1. How has the Boko Haram insurgency affected residential property demand and values in North-Eastern Nigeria?
2. What risk-mitigation strategies have real estate investors and developers adopted in response to insecurity?
3. What is the magnitude of the housing deficit attributable to insurgency-induced displacement and property destruction?
4. How have rental markets in host communities responded to IDP influx?
5. What policy measures can restore investor confidence and address the housing crisis in affected regions?

2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1 Theoretical Framework: State Fragility Theory

This study employs Sara Pavanello's State Fragility Theory (2008) as its analytical lens. The theory posits that states with weak governance institutions, political volatility, endemic poverty, widespread unemployment, and low economic development are particularly susceptible to violent instability. Nigeria exhibits multiple symptoms of state fragility, including inability to provide basic services consistently, weak policing capacity, corruption, and challenges in extending governance over the full territorial jurisdiction. These fragility indicators create an environment where insurgency can thrive and, in turn, where real estate markets become highly sensitive to security shocks rather than purely economic fundamentals.

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The theory is particularly relevant because it explains why traditional real estate valuation models based on location, infrastructure, and economic growth break down in conflict settings. In fragile states, security becomes the primary locational attribute, superseding conventional determinants of property value.

2.2 Impact of Armed Conflict on Property Markets: Global Evidence

The relationship between armed conflict and property markets has been documented across multiple contexts. In Syria, the civil war caused property values in Aleppo to collapse by over 70% in conflict zones while inflating prices in safer coastal regions (Le Billon, 2021). Similarly, in Iraq, post-2003 insurgency led to significant spatial redistribution of property demand, with Baghdad's Green Zone experiencing price premiums while peripheral neighborhoods depreciated (Makdisi, 2018). These patterns suggest that conflict creates bifurcated markets: depreciation in active conflict zones and inflation in safe havens.

2.3 Insurgency and Property Values in Nigeria

Previous research indicates that in Boko Haram-affected areas, property values either stagnated or declined in most locations, with increases occurring only in select areas where quality and locational advantages induced growth. Orekan (2014) noted that property values dropped significantly due to mass exodus from conflict-prone zones to relatively peaceful areas. A more recent study by Johnnie and Achinihi (2025) found that 62% of property market participants in Nigeria agree that war and crisis significantly diminish market stability, reducing investments and lowering property values in conflict-affected areas. The study further confirms that political instability and insurgencies, such as Boko Haram attacks, have forced mass displacements, reducing housing demand in affected regions and causing investors to withdraw due to uncertainty.

2.4 Housing Deficit and Displacement in Nigeria

Nigeria's housing deficit has been a subject of considerable debate, with estimates varying widely depending on methodological approaches. The World Bank estimated Nigeria's housing deficit at 15.56 million units in 2021 (Behr et al., 2021), while the Nigerian government previously cited figures as high as 28 million units with an estimated financing need of ₦21 trillion (State House, 2023). However, the National Housing Data Technical Committee, inaugurated by the Federal Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, released harmonized data in January 2026 indicating that Nigeria's housing deficit for 2025 stood at 14.925 million units, derived from multiple

validated sources including national household surveys and housing adequacy indices (FMHUD, 2026). This clarification underscores the importance of standardized data for evidence-based policy.

The Boko Haram insurgency has substantially aggravated this deficit. In Borno State alone, approximately 30% of private houses have been affected by the conflict, representing a critical dimension of the housing crisis that extends beyond quantitative shortage to qualitative inadequacy.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

The study conceptualizes the relationship between insurgency and real estate markets through three transmission channels:

1. **Demand Shock Channel:** Mass displacement reduces effective demand in conflict zones while inflating demand in host communities.
2. **Supply Destruction Channel:** Physical destruction of housing stock and developer withdrawal constrain supply.
3. **Risk Premium Channel:** Insecurity introduces a security risk premium that alters investor behavior and capital allocation.

3. Methodology

3.1 Research Design

This study adopts a mixed-methods research design, combining quantitative document analysis with qualitative data from Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) conducted in Maiduguri (Borno State) and Yola (Adamawa State) between 2020 and 2021. The mixed-methods approach allows for triangulation of findings and provides both statistical rigor and contextual depth.

3.2 Data Sources

Primary Data: Key Informant Interviews with estate surveyors, property valuers, landlords, government officials, and construction firm representatives; Focus Group Discussions with 40+ participants comprising residents, IDPs, teachers, healthcare workers, and local business owners.

Secondary Data: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix Reports (Rounds III, VIII, XIX, XX), covering the period 2014–2018; NEMA historical documents and situation reports (2013–2018); Borno State Government publications on reconstruction and resettlement; - Academic journals,

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conference proceedings, and archival materials; BusinessDay and Guardian Nigeria newspaper reports on real estate market conditions.

3.3 Study Area

Borno State (57,799 km², population 4,171,104 per 2006 Census) was selected as the primary study area because it is the most affected state by Boko Haram insurgency and a major contributor to Nigeria's housing deficit. The state capital, Maiduguri, serves as the primary host community for IDPs and has experienced unique rental market dynamics.

Adamawa State, particularly Yola North and Yola South Local Government Areas, was selected as a secondary study area to capture displacement patterns and market responses in a moderately affected region that also serves as a host community.

3.4 Data Analysis

Quantitative data analysis employed descriptive statistics using frequency distributions, percentages, means, and trend analysis. The intensity of insurgency was operationalized through annual displacement numbers and the percentage of accessible Local Government Areas (LGAs). Qualitative data from KIIs and FGDs were analyzed using thematic content analysis to identify recurring patterns in investment behavior, risk perception, and market adaptation strategies.

3.5 Limitations

The study acknowledges several limitations. First, security constraints during peak insurgency periods (2014–2016) limited data collection in inaccessible LGAs. Second, property transaction data in conflict zones are often informal and poorly documented, introducing measurement error. Third, the cross-sectional nature of some primary data limits causal inference. Despite these limitations, the triangulation of multiple data sources enhances the reliability of findings.

4. Results and Data Analysis

4.1 Intensity of Boko Haram Insurgency (2013–2018)

Table 1: Displacement Statistics in Borno State (2013–2018)

Year	Displaced Per Year	Returnees	Cumulative IDPs	Accessible LGAs	% of Total Displacement
2013	55,094	—	55,094	24	2.94%
2014	847,600	—	902,694	5	45.23%

Year	Displaced Per Year	Returnees	Cumulative IDPs	Accessible LGAs	% of Total Displacement
2015	522,151	—	1,424,845	7	27.87%
2016	36,535	—	1,461,380	15	1.95%
2017	412,452	547,387	1,326,445	23	22.01%
2018	NC	884,250	442,195	27	—

Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix; NEMA; Nigerian Army

Peak displacement occurred in 2014, with 847,600 persons newly displaced, representing 45.23% of the total displacement over the study period. This coincided with the period of maximum insurgency control, during which only 5 out of 27 LGAs remained accessible to government and humanitarian actors. - Cumulative IDPs peaked at 1,461,380 in 2016, indicating the lagged effect of displacement as new displacements compounded with existing IDP populations. - By 2018, 884,250 returnees had been recorded, yet 442,195 IDPs remained in displacement camps, suggesting that return was partial and that significant populations remained displaced due to destroyed housing, ongoing insecurity, or livelihood collapse.

The data reveals a strong inverse correlation between insurgency intensity (measured by inaccessible LGAs) and displacement volume. In 2014, when only 18.5% of LGAs were accessible, displacement was at its maximum. As accessibility improved to 85% by 2017, returnee numbers increased substantially.

4.2 Residential Accommodation Conditions of Returnees

Table 2: State of Residential Accommodation Upon Return (Borno State)

Condition	Number of Returnees	Percentage
Not damaged	117,041	57%
Partly damaged	42,377	22%
Burnt/destroyed	32,287	16%
Temporary accommodation	10,092	5%
Total	201,797	100%

Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix; NEMA

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Critical Implications of 43% of returnees require residential accommodation (partly damaged + burnt/destroyed + temporary = 22% + 16% + 5%). Applying the average household size of 7 persons (IOM, 2015), this translates to approximately 612,683 persons requiring housing assistance. At 7 persons per household, the housing need equates to approximately 87,526 housing units for returnees alone, excluding the needs of non-returned IDPs and natural population growth. This finding is significant because it quantifies the direct housing impact of the insurgency in Borno State, demonstrating that property destruction is not merely a private loss but a public policy challenge requiring massive reconstruction investment.

4.3 Property Market Impact Indicators

Table 3: Summary of Property Market Indicators in Boko Haram-Impacted Regions

Indicator	Measurement	Period	Source
Property demand decline (Northern Nigeria)	40%	Q1 peak period	BusinessDay/NIESV
Property price decline (Kano prime locations)	30–40%	Post-2009	Market reports
Price per plot (Kano, post-decline)	$36,000	Post-2009	Market reports
Vacancy rates (6 affected states)	30%	2020	NIESV
Housing deficit increase (Borno State)	43%	2013–2018	IOM/NEMA

Vacancy Rate Distribution by State:

State	Reported Vacancy Rate
Yobe	30%
Adamawa	30%
Borno	30%
Katsina	30%

State	Reported Vacancy Rate
Kano	30%
Kaduna	30%

Source: Nigerian Institution of Estate Surveyors and Valuers (NIESV), 2020

The uniform 30% vacancy rate across six diverse states suggests a regional contagion effect, where insecurity in core conflict states (Borno, Yobe) spills over into perception-driven market adjustments in adjacent states (Kano, Kaduna, Katsina). This indicates that investor risk assessment is not solely based on objective security conditions but also on regional perception and media coverage.

4.4 Rental Price Dynamics in Maiduguri (Host Community)

Maiduguri presents a unique case of a host community experiencing severe rental inflation despite being located within a conflict-affected state. The city's relative safety compared to rural Borno made it the primary destination for IDPs, humanitarian agencies, and government security personnel.

Table 4: Rent Price Comparison in Maiduguri (Pre-Insurgency vs. During Insurgency)

Property Type	Pre-Insurgency (2000–2009)	During Insurgency (2020)	Percentage Increase
Small residential (2–3 bedrooms)	₦225,000	₦450,000	100%
Large residential (premium)	₦2,000,000	₦10,000,000	400%
Standard hotel (per night)	₦2,500 ($6)	₦10,000–50,000 ($27–137)	300–1,900%

Sources: FGD Maiduguri; Equal Times; Arab News; TRT World

The 400% increase for large residential properties reflects the influx of high-income humanitarian workers, government officials, and international contractors who could afford premium rents. The astronomical 1,900% increase in hotel rates illustrates the severe supply constraint created by the sudden concentration of expatriate and agency personnel in a city with limited formal hospitality infrastructure.

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Field observations from TRT World (2018) confirm that Maiduguri's population swelled from its designed capacity of 2 million to approximately 5 million, stretching all urban services. The director of the government's urban planning board confirmed that "a house originally designed for two-three families now takes in about ten," indicating severe overcrowding and informal subdivision.

Current Rent Trends (2025): Recent reports indicate that house rents in Maiduguri now range from ₦300,000 to ₦1.5 million or more, depending on location, suggesting that rental inflation has persisted even as security conditions have partially stabilized. This persistence indicates structural changes in the housing market, including reduced housing stock, increased population, and continued presence of humanitarian actors.

4.5 Investment Decision-Making Patterns Under Insecurity

Qualitative data from KIIs and FGDs reveal five distinct behavioral adaptations by real estate investors and developers:

a. Security Rating Integration Companies now explicitly include "security rating" as a primary criterion before purchasing land for residential or commercial projects. This represents a fundamental shift from traditional locational analysis focused on accessibility, infrastructure, and demographics.

b. High-Risk Area Avoidance Developers are increasingly avoiding high-risk LGAs, even where land is cheaper and government incentives exist. This avoidance behavior worsens housing shortages in precisely those areas with the greatest need.

c. "Wait-and-See" Posture Investors in major Northern cities, including Abuja, have adopted a cautious stance, slowing the property market even in areas with no direct conflict exposure. This demonstrates the contagion effect of insecurity on regional investment sentiment.

d. Loss of Investment Confidence Security challenges have resulted in a measurable loss of investment confidence, with private equity groups and institutional investors redirecting capital to more predictable markets.

e. Capital Flight Diaspora Nigerians and domestic institutional investors have shifted focus to Southern markets (Lagos, Port Harcourt, Abuja) and international markets, depriving Northern Nigeria of critical development capital.

Construction Industry Impact: The insurgency has negatively affected the construction industry through supply chain disruptions, labor shortages, and increased security costs. Developers face reduced profit margins and heightened risk due to unpredictable logistics and material procurement challenges. Staff are increasingly reluctant to work in insecure areas, particularly after dark, while customers avoid site visits to insecure locations.

4.6 The Dual-Market Phenomenon

The data reveals a dual-market phenomenon that challenges conventional real estate theory:

Dimension	Conflict Zones	Host Communities
Demand	Collapsed (-40%)	Inflated (+100–400% rents)
Property Values	Depreciated (30–40% decline)	Appreciated (rental)
Vacancy	High (30%)	Negative (overcrowding)
Investment	Withdrawal	Selective entry (humanitarian-driven)
Supply Response	None (destruction)	Constrained (overcrowding)

This bifurcation aligns with Orekan's (2014) finding that property values drop in conflict-prone zones but increase in relatively peaceful areas receiving displaced populations. However, the magnitude of the Maiduguri rental inflation (up to 1,900% for hotels) exceeds typical conflict-induced market adjustments documented in other contexts, suggesting unique features of the Nigerian case including the scale of displacement, the concentration of humanitarian spending, and the limited geographic safe havens available.

4.7 Discussion

4.7.1 Market Dynamics Transformation

The findings demonstrate that insecurity has emerged as a dominant force reshaping Nigeria's property map, surpassing traditional economic factors in explanatory power. The 43% housing deficit increase in Borno State translating to 87,526 housing units needed for returnees alone represents a policy challenge of immense scale. Yet investor avoidance of high-risk areas blocks new project starts, creating a supply-demand paradox where housing need is monumental but private supply is constrained by insecurity.

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The 30% vacancy rate across six states, including those not directly experiencing active conflict, indicates that insecurity operates through both direct destruction and indirect perception effects. This has implications for real estate valuation practice in Nigeria: traditional comparable sales methods may fail to capture security risk premiums, necessitating the development of conflict-adjusted valuation frameworks.

4.7.2 Investment Decision Framework Under Insecurity

The study documents a fundamental shift in investment decision criteria. Traditional factors (inflation rates, population growth, infrastructure development, urbanization trends) have been supplemented or in some cases supplanted by insecurity-added factors:

Traditional Factors	**Insecurity-Added Factors**
Inflation rates	Security rating of LGA
Population growth	Percentage of accessible LGAs
Infrastructure quality	Distance from conflict zones
Urbanization trends	Community policing strength
Economic fundamentals	Government security response capacity
	Presence of humanitarian actors

This expanded framework explains why previously overlooked suburban safe areas attract fresh capital while strategically located but insecure zones lose investment confidence. It also explains the "wait-and-see" behavior observed even in relatively safe Northern cities: investors apply a regional risk premium that discounts the entire North-East and North-West geopolitical zones.

4.7.3 Comparative Property Value Trajectory

Table 5: Pre- vs. Post-Insurgency Property Values in Kano Prime Locations

Period	Price per Plot (USD)	Change
Pre-2009 (baseline)	~$51,400	—
Post-insurgency (peak decline)	$36,000	-30%
Maximum decline range	—	-30 to -40%

Calculation based on reported 30–40% decline to $36,000

The decline in Kano a major commercial hub not directly controlled by insurgents demonstrates the spatial contagion of insecurity effects. Kano's property market suffered not from direct destruction but from regional risk repricing, as investors applied a security discount to all Northern Nigerian markets. This finding is consistent with Johnnie and Achinihi (2025), who found that investors concentrate primarily in urban centers like Lagos and Abuja, leaving other regions underdeveloped due to perceived security risks.

4.7.4 Host Community Pressure and Infrastructure Strain

Maiduguri's population doubling from approximately 2 million to 5 million within several years created severe pressure on urban infrastructure:

- **Education:** School overcrowding reached 150–200 students per classroom;
- **Health:** Medical facilities experienced unsustainable patient loads;
- **Housing:** Original single-family homes were subdivided to accommodate multiple families;
- **Water and sanitation:** Municipal systems designed for 2 million residents strained under 5 million users.

The conversion of 8 schools into the Government Day Secondary School Mairi alone illustrates the magnitude of infrastructure adaptation required. The Housing Development Advocacy Network (HDAN) warns that perpetual security challenges may worsen Nigeria's housing deficit as real estate investment drops, with the deficit potentially expanding beyond current estimates if displacement persists and reconstruction lags.

4.7.5 The "War Economy" Paradox

An interesting finding from qualitative data is the emergence of a localized "war economy" in Maiduguri's real estate sector. While the broader market suffered from capital flight and demand collapse, some property developers and landlords profited from the humanitarian influx. As documented by TRT World (2018), some entrepreneurs purchased panic-sold properties at steep discounts and later benefited from rental inflation. One developer reported turnover growing from under $30,000 pre-war to nearly $1 million in 2017.

This paradox where conflict creates both market destruction and market opportunity has important policy implications. It suggests that well-targeted interventions can channel private sector energy toward reconstruction, but also that unregulated war economies may exacerbate inequality and create vested interests in prolonged displacement.

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5. Conclusion

This study demonstrates that the Boko Haram insurgency has fundamentally transformed real estate market dynamics in Nigeria's impacted regions through three primary transmission channels: demand shock, supply destruction, and risk premium effects. The quantified impacts are severe: a 43% housing deficit increase in Borno State, a 40% property demand decline across Northern Nigeria, 30% vacancy rates across six affected states, and rental price increases of 100–400% in host communities.

The research reveals a dual-market phenomenon unprecedented in scale: while conflict zones experience demand collapse and depreciation, host communities like Maiduguri face severe inflationary pressure driven by IDP influx and humanitarian actor concentration. Investment decisions have shifted from traditional economic fundamentals to security-centric risk assessment, with developers avoiding high-risk areas and investors adopting "wait-and-see" attitudes that perpetuate housing shortages.

The 87,526 housing units needed for returnees in Borno State alone remain largely unaddressed due to capital flight, project delays, and continued insecurity in rural LGAs. Without urgent government intervention to restore peace, protect developments, and create credible investment incentives, Nigeria's housing deficit now officially estimated at 14.9–15.2 million units will worsen, particularly in the North-East.

The study contributes to the literature on conflict and property markets by providing empirical evidence from one of the world's most severe contemporary insurgencies. It challenges the assumption that real estate markets automatically recover post-conflict, demonstrating instead that prolonged insecurity can cause structural market changes including altered investor behavior, regional risk repricing, and infrastructure strain that persist even as security conditions improve.

Future research should examine the long-term recovery trajectory of Maiduguri's property market, the effectiveness of security-risk insurance mechanisms, and the potential for diaspora investment to catalyze reconstruction. The development of conflict-adjusted property valuation methodologies also represents an important avenue for applied research.

5.1. Recommendations

Based on the findings, this study proposes a multi-tiered policy framework organized by implementation timeframe:

5.1.1 Short-Term Interventions (1–2 Years)

1. Emergency Housing Aid Program Provide culturally adaptable housing assistance to citizens of Boko Haram-affected LGAs, prioritizing vulnerable groups including female-headed households, the elderly, and persons with disabilities.

2. Urgent Reconstruction Initiative Commence reconstruction and renovation in liberated areas to alleviate the housing crisis and create immediate employment opportunities. This should be coordinated with the Borno State Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement.

3. Security-First Approach Accelerate peace restoration through enhanced early warning systems, community policing, and rapid response commands. Security is a prerequisite for market recovery; without it, other interventions will fail.

5.1.2 Medium-Term Strategies (3–5 Years)

4. Developer Incentive Package Create targeted incentives for developers to return to high-risk areas, including: - Tax holidays and reduced land use charges; - Government security guarantees for construction sites; - Fast-tracked building approvals; - Subsidized construction materials.

5. Security-Risk Insurance Framework Establish a federal security-risk insurance scheme to protect real estate investments in designated high-risk zones. This would pool risk across multiple projects and provide investors with confidence to re-enter markets.

6. Constitutional Amendment for State Policing Amend the Nigerian Constitution to allow for state police establishment, enabling effective grassroots policing tailored to local security conditions. This addresses a structural governance gap that undermines property rights protection.

5.1.3 Long-Term Solutions (5+ Years)

7. Coordinated Federal Housing Intervention The Federal Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (FMHUD) should coordinate a targeted housing deficit reduction program with explicit focus on North-Eastern states, integrating displacement recovery with broader housing supply expansion.

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8. Multi-Stakeholder Partnership Platform Strengthen coordination among public institutions, state ministries of finance, development partners (World Bank, AfDB, UN-Habitat), and private sector actors to align investment with recovery needs.

9. Root Cause Addressing Implement comprehensive economic development programs addressing poverty, unemployment, and infrastructural decay that fuel insurgency recruitment. Without addressing root causes, security gains may prove temporary.

5.1.4 Investment Climate Improvement Measures

10. Standardized Security Rating System Develop and publish a standardized security rating for real estate investment zones, providing transparent, data-driven guidance to investors. This would replace perception-based risk assessment with objective metrics.

11. Diaspora Engagement Strategy Create confidence-building measures to attract diaspora Nigerian capital back to impacted regions, including investment matching funds, guaranteed returns for social housing projects, and streamlined repatriation procedures.

12. Project Protection Protocols Establish government protocols to protect ongoing developments and restore investor confidence, including rapid security response for construction sites and compensation mechanisms for conflict-related losses.

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